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Introduction
The sample of mortgages reaching any advanced stage of the process, i.e., ﬁnal
approval by the lender or residing in the portfolio of an ultimate investor, is generated by
a number of stages at which agents make decisions. These stages include: borrower
selection of a mortgage type and lender, lender and perhaps approval of the borrower for
private mortgage insurance (PMI), ﬁnal acceptance by the borrower of the terms offered,
and possible sale to secondary market. There is substantial interest in determining the
behavior of particular agents involved in the mortgage transaction. First, regulators need
to determine if lenders or private mortgage insurers, in the underwriting process, are
discriminating against particular demographic groups. Second, a variety of actors need to
determine the credit risk posed by lending to particular borrowers under various terms.
These two questions are clearly related, and crucial to fair-lending regulation, because the
justiﬁcation of differential treatment of borrowers is potentially discriminatory unless
justiﬁed by a business purpose, presumably credit risk.
In practice, we can only observe underwriting practices on the mortgage products
offered by a limited fraction of all lenders for applications that are actually completed
and only observe ultimate default losses for loans that are actually originated. In both
cases, the sample that is observed is a small and likely nonrandomly selected subsample
of all potential mortgage activity. Unfortunately, virtually all analysis of lending criteria
and credit risk, including recent papers by Ferguson and Peters (1995) and by Hunter and
Walker (1995), is based on single-equation models of applicant rejection, default, or
default loss.1 These single-equation models provide information that is conditional on the
process in which the mortgages are originated. For some purposes, conditional estimates
THE JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 1
87
Robert F. Phillips*
Anthony M. J. Yezer* Self-Selection and Tests for 
Bias and Risk in Mortgage
Lending: Can You Price the
Mortgage If You Don’t 
Know the Process?
*Department of Economics, The George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052.
Date Revised—June 1995; Accepted—July 1995.
Abstract. There is increasing interest in understanding the determinants of mortgage
rejection by lenders and default by borrowers. Although many researchers have proposed
simple single-equation models of rejection and default, we argue that far more complex
econometric speciﬁcations are needed. This paper focuses attention on problems of sample
selection in the process creating a sample of applicants for conventional mortgages. We
illustrate that corrections for sample selection bias may have a substantial effect on
estimation results and hence should not be ignored in studies of mortgage rejection or
default.are adequate but we will demonstrate that they may yield seriously biased estimates for
two purposes, testing for discrimination and credit risk, for which there is increasing
demand today. In addition, there has been almost no research on some aspects of the
selection process that create the observed subsamples that form the basis for the single-
equation models. Choice of FHA vs. conventional mortgages and of ﬁxed- vs. adjustable-
rate mortgages have received some attention but determinants of participation in special
programs, partial completion of applications, application for and granting of private
mortgage insurance, and refusal of mortgage terms offered have been largely ignored.
In this paper we discuss the nature of the econometric problems of sample selection
bias complicating the estimation of equations to be used in testing for discrimination or
credit risk. This involves initial consideration of the circumstances under which
unconditional rather than conditional estimates are needed, followed by a review of the
estimation problems involved in obtaining such unconditional estimates. Then we offer
two illustrative examples and test for potential problems caused by selection bias. First,
we consider testing for discriminating in mortgage lending by estimating a mortgage
rejection equation to determine if demographic characteristics of the borrower are
associated with differential underwriting outcomes. Sample selection bias in estimates of
the rejection equation may arise if applicants self-select among alternative mortgage
programs or lenders. Second, we examine the effects of sample selection on estimates of
a mortgage refusal equation. Refusals can only be observed once the application has been
approved. Finally, based on these two very different illustrations, we conclude with
implications of these ﬁndings and suggestions for future research.
When Are Unconditional Estimates Needed?
Conditional estimates of mortgage approval are obtained from single-equation models
using the actual sample of applications received for a particular type of mortgage by one
or more lenders, and conditional estimates of credit risk are based on the subsample of
mortgages originated from the initial applicants. We refer to these estimates as con-
ditional estimates of a behavioral equation because they apply to a subset of individuals,
for example, all those who actually applied for a particular type of mortgage. Conditional
estimates predict what happens as a result of the decision criteria of lenders in under-
writing mortgages and borrowers in defaulting as long as the process generating these
subsamples is unchanged. In contrast, there are a number of possible unconditional
estimates of mortgage rejection that predict what would happen if some larger sample of
potential applicants were to apply for a particular mortgage type offered by one or more
lenders. The appropriate unconditional estimates of a rejection equation will depend on
the purposes to which the inferences are put. For many regulatory purposes, estimates of
the rejection equation unconditional to all applicants at a lender or group of lenders is
needed.2 Unconditional estimates of credit risk predict the losses if some expanded
sample of potential applicants were approved.
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where A*, R*, D* are vectors of dependent variables reﬂecting the probability that actual
mortgage applicants at one or more lenders apply for a particular mortgage type at a
group of lenders, the probability of rejecting the application for endorsement, and the
likelihood of future default respectively; the kJ are constant terms, aA, bR and qD are
vectors of coefﬁcients to be estimated; XA, XR, and XD are matrices of independent
variables, and the eJ (J5A, R, D) are random error terms whose properties will be the
object of some discussion. Estimates of equations (2) and (3) are the basis of attempts to
detect the presence of bias in lending and credit risk, respectively.
The common procedure is to form conditional estimates of the determinants of the
probabilities of application, rejection and default. These are obtained by sequential
probit or logit techniques, i.e., by applying single-equation probit or logit estimation to
each equation in turn. The actual values J*5A*, R*, D* are not observed but an
indicator J51 if J*$0 and 0 otherwise is observed. Of course, the second equation can
only be observed for cases in which A51 and the third equation is only observed when
R50. Thus the estimates are conditional on the prior stage decision.
Now consider attempts to test for discrimination in conventional mortgage lending by
estimating the rejection equation, (2). Assume that there is an alternative government-
sponsored program offered through these lenders that is attractive to high-risk borrowers.
Then this type of applicant will self-select away from the conventional mortgage products
and the threshold variable for applying for a conventional mortgage at these lenders, A*,
will be negatively associated with credit risk. If some of the risk factors that inﬂuence the
mortgage product application and rejection decisions are unobservable to the
econometrician, then rAR, the correlation between the error terms, eA and eR, is negative.3
Given that R51, 0 is only observed conditional on A51, this implies that, in the
subsample of applicants to conventional lenders, EC(eR)¢0, and hence the estimated
constant term k ˆR will be biased downward.4 Put another way, estimates of equation (2)
will tend to predict lower levels of loan rejection than would occur if all applicants chose
to apply for conventional mortgages. The argument is symmetric with regard to the self-
selection process of applicants. If applicants with unobserved characteristics associated
with lower risk are differentially attracted to the government-sponsored program, we
would ﬁnd rAR$0, EC(eR)$0, and k ˆR biased upward.
Now extend the thought experiment further by assuming that the government-
sponsored mortgage program is only available to minority borrowers and that minority
status has no effect on the probability of rejection by conventional lenders. These
assumptions simplify the argument to the point where it can be made conceptually.
Because self-selection into the government program is unavailable to non-minority
applicants, the expectation of the error term in conditional estimates of the conventional
rejection equation for non-minority applicants would be zero. However, the expectation
for the error term in conditional estimates of the conventional rejection equation for
minority applicants would be negative (positive) in cases where the government program
was particularly attractive to applicants in the highest (lowest) risk categories in terms of
unobserved factors in the error term. Conditional estimation of the rejection equation by
ordinary probit techniques using a speciﬁcation that incorporates a dummy variable for
minority status will then result in a negative (positive) bias in the estimated minority
coefﬁcient, compared to its true value of zero, as the government program is differentially
attractive to minority applicants in the highest (lowest) risk categories. In effect, the
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to other parameters of the rejection equation when single-equation probit techniques are
used. Clearly estimating a mortgage rejection equation with single-equation probit raises
potentially serious problems of self-selection bias if regulators want to make inferences
about what would happen if underwriting criteria for conventional mortgages were
applied to all applicants. This confusion over choice of estimator may lead to perverse
regulatory feedback. For example, lenders may respond to accusations of bias by
increasing awareness of special loan programs. But the simple model above illustrates
that this would increase selection bias and cause single-equation probit models of
rejection for conventional mortgage products to indicate increased discrimination.
Alternatively lenders could ‘‘improve’’ their fair-lending status without changing
underwriting criteria simply by encouraging the best minority risks from the special
mortgage programs to apply for conventional mortgages. Changing the selection process
in which applicants choose mortgage products will change single-equation probit
estimates of the rejection equation even if underwriting criteria are unchanged. Such
changes in process do not change unconditional estimates. Thus unless there is
information on the process generating the mortgage applicants, it may be misleading to
rely on single-equation probit estimates of rejection equations to test for discrimination.
Although this detailed discussion has addressed problems of testing for discrimination
with a rejection equation, the problem of partial observability and the potential selection
bias created by relying on a subpopulation of endorsed mortgages when estimating
default equations is likely more signiﬁcant. Interest in determinants of default has been
linked to regulatory examination of underwriting criteria by fair-lending requirements
that variables used in rejection be justiﬁed by a legitimate business purpose. This
justiﬁcation requires estimates of default or default loss that are not conditional on the
current underwriting criteria being used to reject a fraction of applicants. Unconditional
estimates for the population of applicants are needed.5 Default cannot be observed on
mortgages that are rejected. Given that rejection is based on characteristics associated
with default, it is likely that the same factors inﬂuencing the error term of the rejection
equation also inﬂuence the error term of the default equation. Under these circum-
stances, the problem of partial observability results in estimates of a conditional default
equation obtained using single-equation probit techniques that yield biased estimates of
the parameters of the unconditional default equation. Berkovec et al. (1994) have recently
demonstrated that the conditional default equation can be used to test for past discrim-
ination, but estimates of the unconditional default equation are required to validate a
credit scoring scheme.
Much of the discussion of the problem of partial observability has been used on the
bivariate probit model developed in articles by Poirier (1980), Farber (1983), Fishe, Trost
and Lurie (1981), and Meng and Schmidt (1985) following the seminal enquiry by Zellner
and Lee (1965). This literature analyzes the signiﬁcant estimation problems present in
cases of sequential partial observability. These problems arise if there is a cross-equation
correlation among error terms. Such correlation is likely because a common set of factors
that are difﬁcult for the econometrician to observe are likely to be missing from several,
if not all, of the equations. For example, expected future income and expected future
collateral value are not observed by the econometrician, and one must be content with
statistical constructs. These unobservable variables are considered by lenders in rejection
decisions and play a role in the ﬁnal observation of default or default loss. To the extent
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we can conclude that the expected value of the error in equation (3) conditional on loan
approval, EC(eD)5E(eD |R50), is negative and that the estimated constant term in a
default equation estimated using single-equation probit on the subsample of endorsed
mortgages will be biased downward. However, estimates of default in terms of the entire
model represented by equations (1) through (3) would require us to consider two levels of
self-selection, i.e., we would need to consider the possibility that neither rRD nor rAD is
equal to zero. Similarly, the effects of selection bias on estimates of slope coefﬁcients in
the default equation is very complex and even the direction of the effect is not likely to be
determined based on a priori considerations.
Illustration of Selection Bias in Tests for Discrimination
Ultimately the importance of self-selection problems raised here is an empirical
question which has been neglected in the literature. In this section, we illustrate the
problem using a natural experiment from the literature on discrimination in mortgage
lending. Speciﬁcally, we evaluate the difference between conditional and unconditional
estimates of a rejection equation when the process generating applicants has features
similar to that discussed in the previous section. In terms of the system presented as
equations (1)–(3), we are interested in estimating equation (2) but recognize the problems
created by prior selection due to equation (1).
The speciﬁc example selected for analysis is based on the data on mortgage
applications taken in the Boston MSA during 1990 and collected by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston (see Munnell et al., 1992).6 The natural experiment arises because the
sample included applications made on ordinary conventional loans and applications
made through special programs, usually programs with direct government sponsorship.
The most common special program in the dataset is offered by the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency but a number of other smaller programs, particularly for ﬁrst-
time homebuyers, appear. These special mortgage programs have qualiﬁcation criteria
that include income, loan amount, demographic characteristics of the household,
previous homeownership, and even location. Households self-select into the special
mortgage programs based on their perception of the speciﬁc advantages of participation.
Even among low income homebuyers requesting small loan amounts to buy inexpensive
houses, a substantial proportion do not participate in these programs and apply for
‘‘regular’’ conventional mortgages.
Subsequent approval or rejection of the mortgage application is then observed for all
applicants. However, we are unable to observe the underwriting process that would have
been used for special program applicants if they had applied for conventional mortgages.
There are a number of reasons to suspect that underwriting for special program
participants is different than underwriting for conventional mortgages. First, some of
these programs carry guarantees against credit risk. Second, special program applicants
have taken extra steps to ﬁnd programs, document eligibility, and comply with
regulations. Third, underwriting for special programs places an extra burden on lenders
to determine both program eligibility and creditworthiness. Following a detailed
reexamination of banking ﬁles, Horne (1994) has reported that special program
applicants may be rejected because of failure to meet conditions of the program. Such
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The existence of special programs creates a problem of partial observability. We can
only observe the regular mortgage rejection decisions for the subsample of applicants
who seek regular conventional loans. In various studies using this data, the problem of
partial observability for special program participants has been ‘‘solved’’ in three ways:
totally ignore the problem (Horne, 1994), use all observations but insert a dummy
variable for program participation (Glennon and Stengle, 1944), and estimate a rejection
equation after casewise deletion of observations on special program applicants (Hunter
and Walker, 1995). None of these approaches results in unbiased or consistent estimates
of the parameters of the conventional loan rejection equation, shown as equation (2) in
the previous section. The empirical importance of this estimation problem is illustrated
by the reestimation conducted in this section.
Because the reliability of this dataset has been questioned in a number of sources (see
discussion in Horne, 1994), some modest attempts at data-cleaning were undertaken on
the sample of 2,814 observations before performing the estimation. First, applications
that were clearly intended for the purchase of rental properties were dropped because
underwriting investment properties should differ from owner-occupied units. Second, six
cases in which the appraised value exceeded both the loan amount and the purchase price
by exactly two million dollars were adjusted so that the appraised value equaled the
purchase price. Third, based on alphabetic codes used to describe special program
mortgages, a number of observations were deleted because they involved sale of real estate
owned, construction loans, VA or FHA mortgages, second mortgages, and other cate-
gories that were clearly not special low income programs or regular conventional mort-
gages. Taken together, these steps reduced the sample size by 352 to 2,464 applications.
Compared to problems with the data noted in the literature, these adjustments are
quite modest and still leave substantial room for errors in variables. For example, the ﬁnal
loan-to-value ratio in the sample used here has a mean of .75 and ranges from .03 to 6.68
with a standard deviation of .23. Clearly the ﬁnal version of the data has substantial
measurement error but this has not prevented estimation results based on this data from
gaining substantial attention. Measurement error is less of a concern in this study
because our focus is on illustration of estimation problems created by selection bias
rather than speciﬁc hypothesis testing where the effects of measurement error could be
consequential.
The variables used in the empirical analysis are described in Exhibit 1. Most of these
variables are straightforward applications of the data and have been used in previous
studies. Sales and appraised prices and income are expressed in thousands of dollars so
that estimated coefﬁcients are scaled more conveniently. Loan/Value, the loan-to-value
ratio, used by lenders to make the reject decision, is based on appraised value because this
is the appropriate decision variable for the lender’s estimate of credit risk. The applicant’s
decision is based on contract price, PRICE31023, because appraised value is not
available until after the application decision has been made. The variable labeled
CREDIT was constructed as the product of individual variables indicating repayment
problems based on observations of the mortgage payment history, consumer credit
record, and formal indicators of bankruptcy or charge-offs.7 Higher values of CREDIT
reﬂect greater problems with repayment and applicants with an unblemished credit
record were assigned a value of zero for this variable.
Speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst-stage mortgage choice equation describing the decision to
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ﬁrst on a belief that program parameters regarding income, type and location of housing
purchase intended, and demographic characteristics would be important in the
borrower’s choice process. Accordingly various versions of the conventional mortgage
choice function were estimated using the available information in the dataset reﬂecting
these factors. Arguments of the mortgage choice function were limited to variables for
which borrowers should have information before applying. This eliminated appraised
value, and credit judgments by the lender. Selection of a ﬁnal functional form was based
on a process in which variables were dropped from an extended estimating equation until
all included regressors had a t-ratio greater than 1.5, except for demographic variables
that were kept in the equations.
The ﬁnal estimation results for the conventional mortgage choice equation are
displayed in Exhibit 2. As expected, income and house price vary directly with the index
of conventional mortgage choice. The negative effect of a short work history likely arises
because conventional underwriting criteria consider employment stability to be
important. Minority applicants and property location in a census tract with high
minority residential population are both negatively associated with conventional
mortgage choice. Overall, characteristics of the census tract in which the property is
located appear signiﬁcant for this mortgage choice decision, perhaps reﬂecting a general




CONDO Dummy variable51 if property is a condominium, mean5.29
COSIGN-GIFT Dummy variable51 if application has cosigner or gift, mean5.184
CREDIT Index of credit history problems, mean52.49
CreditOK Dummy variable51 if applicant passed lender’s credit test, mean5.91
DEPENDENTS Number of dependent children in household, mean5.78
Expense/Income Total ﬁxed expense to income ratio in percent, mean533
HiAgedTract Dummy variable51 if average age in tract>median, mean5.40
HiEducatedTract Dummy variable51 if average education in tract>median, mean 5.76
HiIncomeTract Dummy variable51 if average income in tract>median, mean5.84
HiMinorityTract Dummy variable51 if % minority in tract>median, mean5.083
HiVacancyTract Dummy variable51 if % vacant units in tract>median, mean5.43
INCOME Monthly income in dollars, mean56,311
LOAN31023 Loan amount in thousands of dollars, mean5142.3
Loan/Value Ratio of loan amount to appraised value, mean5.78
MALE Dummy variable51 if applicant is male (single or married), mean5.79
MARRIED Dummy variable51 if applicants are married couple, mean5.61
MINORITY Dummy variable51 if ﬁrst applicant is Black or Hispanic, mean5.19
MULTIFAMILY Dummy variable51 if unit is in a 2–4 family structure, mean5.01
PMISEEK Dummy variable51 if applied for PMI, mean5.192
PRICE31023 Appraised value in thousands of dollars, mean5194.9
REVIEW Number of times application reviewed by lender, mean51.2
SELFEMPLOY Dummy variable51 if applicant self-employed, mean5.126
UNVERIFIED Dummy variable51 if unveriﬁable information in loan ﬁle, mean5.048
WORK<2YRS Dummy variable51 if applicant has worked at current job<2 years, mean5.083locational component of the special programs.
As with the choice equation, relatively inclusive speciﬁcations of the rejection equation
were initially tested using single-equation probit and variables whose estimated
coefﬁcients were even marginally signiﬁcant were retained. However, because the
rejection equation is often estimated to provide information on possible discrimination in
mortgage lending, some additional procedures, common in the literature on testing for
discrimination, were adopted. Speciﬁcally conditional estimates of the rejection equation
were estimated for two subsamples, minority applicants only and non-minority
applicants only.8 The results are displayed in the ﬁrst two columns of Exhibit 3. Based on
the previous literature, there has been some controversy over the inclusion of the
variables  CreditOK and  UNVERIFIED in the speciﬁcation. Carr and Megbolugbe (1993)
have argued that these variables are based almost entirely on lender discretion and hence
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*statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level, two-tailed t-test
**overall ﬁt statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% levelcould be used to discriminate against minorities. Nevertheless, the separate estimates for
minorities and non-minorities indicate that CreditOK and UNVERIFIED are extremely
important and nearly identical in terms of sign and signiﬁcance across equations.
Exclusion of these variables from conditional estimates of the rejection equation would
introduce extreme omitted variables bias and have a substantial effect on the problem of
sample selection bias that we wish to study.
Conditional estimates for the ﬁnal form of the rejection equation are shown in column
(3) of Exhibit 3. The sign and signiﬁcance of all variables on which there are strong a
priori restrictions are in close agreement with these expectations. These results also
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Exhibit 3
Alternate Estimates of the Rejection Equation
Independent Speciﬁcation Test** Conditional Unconditional
Variables Minority Non-Minority Rejection Rejection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 2.74 21.67* 21.42* 21.14*
(2.87) (24.56) (24.97) (23.25)
Expense/Income .04* .021* .023* .031*
(3.20) (4.98) (5.80) (5.45)
Loan/Value .099 .791* .723* .685*
(.15) (3.79) (3.67) (3.10)
CreditOK 21.95* 21.92* 21.91* 22.17*
(27.60) (211.9) (214.2) (212.4)
UNVERIFIED 1.62* 1.70* 1.67* 2.08*
(3.83) (9.08) (9.76) (8.69)
CREDIT 2.002 .010* .007* .0062
(2.32) (2.66) (2.19) (1.46)
SELFEMPLOYED 2.32 .302* .226* .210
(2.81) (2.19) (1.75) (1.29)
MULTIFAMILY 1.21* 1.62* 1.288* 1.15*
(1.80) (2.67) (2.92) (2.33)
HiAgedTract 2.09 .229* .159* .17*
(2.42) (2.15) (1.70) (1.46)
HiVacancyTract .82 .370* .309* .48*
(.34) (3.41) (3.36) (3.55)
MINORITY — — .214* .152
(1.84) (.92)
MALE .06 .338* .232* 2.154
(.24) (2.19) (1.83) (2.82)
MARRIED 2.20 2.413* 2.323* 2.246*
(2.09) (23.66) (23.26) (21.95)
RHO 2.155
(2.53)
NOB 302 1,833 2,141 2,464
c2 166*** 456*** 669*** 666***
*statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level, two-tailed t-test
**probit estimates of rejection equation using only nonparticipants in special mortgage programs
(minority applicants in column (1) and non-minority applicants in column (2))
***overall ﬁt statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% levelresemble previous single-equation probit models estimated using this data. Inclusion of
CreditOK and UNVERIFIED reduces but does not eliminate the positive and signiﬁcant
estimated coefﬁcient for minority applicants. Note that the sex and marital status of the
applicant are both statistically signiﬁcant. Other than one table in which Munnell et al.
(1992) report a signiﬁcant estimated coefﬁcient for marital status and nonsigniﬁcance for
a male dummy, these other demographic characteristics of the household appear to have
been neglected in the literature.
The equation system shown as (1) and (2) in the previous section and with the speciﬁc
arguments shown in the conditional application and rejection estimates in Exhibits 2 and
3, respectively was estimated using bivariate probit techniques allowing RHO, the estimate
of the correlation between error terms in the mortgage choice and rejection equations, to
be non-zero. The speciﬁc estimator, bivariate probit with partial observability and self-
selection, was developed by Poirier (1980) and is discussed in Green (1990). We expect
RHO to be negative because unobservable applicant characteristics measuring credit-
worthiness will cause more creditworthy borrowers to apply for conventional loans in the
mortgage choice equation while this additional creditworthiness will make them less
likely to be rejected in the second equation. Factors positively associated with choice of
conventional loans should be negatively associated with rejection. To the extent that
special programs are designed to serve marginally creditworthy households, loan ofﬁcers
should steer the better risks to conventional loans.
In addition to the problem of selection bias due to partial observability, single-
equation estimates of mortgage rejection also may suffer from simultaneous equations
bias. Speciﬁcally an applicant may choose the loan-to-value ratio, term-to-maturity,
monthly payment, and/or cosigners based on the expectation that this choice will
determine the likelihood of rejection. Concerns over endogeneity of loan terms are not
new and there is substantial evidence that the effect of ignoring simultaneity is to
generate false positives in testing for discrimination. Nevertheless papers ranging from
Munnell et al. (1992) through Hunter and Walker (1995) and Ferguson and Peters (1995)
have also ignored this problem.9 Unfortunately, given that this dataset was taken largely
from lender operating data used in underwriting decisions, identiﬁcation of a separate
applicant demand for loan terms is problematic.
The results of the bivariate probit estimates are shown in column (4) of Exhibit 3. RHO
is negative but nonsigniﬁcant. Should the true correlation coefﬁcient be negative, then
applicants for conventional mortgages have unobserved characteristics that are
associated with a lower tendency to reject or greater creditworthiness. If so, then applying
single-equation probit without correcting for this correlation will result in downward bias
in estimates of the constant term of the rejection equation. This follows because, holding
observable factors constant, the probability of rejection for the subpopulation of
applicants applying for conventional loans will be less than the probability of rejection
for all applicants. The selection process causes conventional mortgage applicants to have
unobserved characteristics that are associated with greater creditworthiness than the
average applicant. Comparison of the conditional and unconditional estimates in
columns (3) and (4) of Exhibit 3 shows that the constant in the unconditional estimates
of the rejection equation is larger, 21.14 >21.42. This is consistent with the negative
RHO. There is a substantial increase in the coefﬁcient for married applicants in going
from columns (3) to (4) as indicated by the increase in the estimated coefﬁcients.
However, the coefﬁcients of dummy variables for minority and male status are smaller in
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estimated coefﬁcients of the constant term and demographic dummies when we allow for
self-selection suggest that the unobservable variables involved in producing these selec-
tion effects are different for different groups. Estimates of coefﬁcients of non-demo-
graphic variables, particularly the continuous variables Expense/Income, Loan/Value, and
CREDIT, are relatively unchanged between the conditional and unconditional estimates
in columns (3) and (4), respectively.
These results indicate that, although the estimate of RHO is nonsigniﬁcant, use of an
estimator that allows for the possibility of applicant self-selection may still have
important implications for tests of discrimination. Overall, the difference, in rejection
probability associated with various demographic groups is smaller and less signiﬁcant in
the unconditional estimates than it is in the conditional single-equation probit estimates
that do not allow for self-selection.
Illustration of Selection Bias in Estimates of Refusal
Before an approved mortgage can be originated, it must be endorsed by the borrower.
Approximately 3.5% of all approved mortgages in this dataset were refused. Single-
equation estimates of a refusal equation give the determinants of refusal conditional on
the mortgage being approved. These may be contrasted with unconditional estimates of
the refusal equation that apply to all applicants, whether they are rejected or approved. In
this section, we investigate the possible presence of selection bias that may arise should
single-equation probit be used to estimate a refusal equation. While the refusal equation
has not been viewed as being particularly signiﬁcant in the past, this illustration may be
useful in considering the potential importance of selection bias in estimates of mortgage
default equations.10 Default occurs with approximately the same frequency as refusal and
it is also only observed for mortgages that have not been rejected. Finally some of the
factors that could generate refusal, such as discovery of a ﬂaw in the property, or sudden
ﬁnancial reversals, could also prompt default if they occur after the mortgage is
endorsed. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to suggest that selection bias may be even
more consequential in a default equation than it is in a refusal equation.
The formal equation system characterizing the full refusal process examined here is:
A*5kA1XAaA1eA (1¢)
R*5kR1XRbR1eR , (2¢)
where A* and R* are now interpreted as indexes that measure mortgage approval and
refusal respectively. Actual refusal, R, is only observed conditional on actual acceptance,
A51, i.e., actual refusal is observed only for A*$0.
Conditional estimates of equation (19) are easily recovered by changing the signs of the
estimated coefﬁcients of the single-equation probit rejection equation in the previous
section. Conditional estimates of the refusal equation using single-equation probit are
shown in Exhibit 4. With little theory available to serve as a guide in specifying this
equation, we initially tested extended functional forms and retained variables whose
estimated coefﬁcients where, at least, marginally signiﬁcant. The ﬁnal functional form
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variables, not deﬁned above and used in the application and rejection analysis, include:
PMISEEK, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower applied for private mortgage
insurance; COSIGN-GIFT, a variable equal to 1 if the borrower had either a cosigner or
gift and 2 if both were present; REVIEW, the number of times that the application was
reviewed by the lender; and HiIncomeTract, a dummy variable indicating property
location in a census tract with median income higher than the average for the entire
Boston metropolitan area.
The conditional estimation results point to two factors inﬂuencing the applicant’s
decision to refuse the loan offer. First, factors associated with higher likelihood of
rejection, particularly failure to pass the credit history test, larger loan amounts and
being single, result in a higher index for refusal. These results suggest that individuals
who believe rejection is likely apply at more than one lender. Second, factors that indicate
that the applicant took extra steps to meet the lender’s criteria, including applying
for PMI, securing a cosigner and/or gift letter, and asking for the application to be
reconsidered, were associated with lower refusal scores.
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c 2 37.1** 54.4**
*statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level, two-tailed t-test
**overall ﬁt statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% levelThe unconditional estimates of the refusal equation allowing for self-selection were
obtained using the same bivariate probit with selection techniques discussed above, and
are shown in the second column of Exhibit 4. The most striking result is the estimate for
RHO of .997, not signiﬁcantly different from 1.0. This estimation result was obtained
from a speciﬁcation that converged but many alternative versions of the refusal equation
did not converge because the estimate of RHO crossed the limit of 1.0.11 Consequently,
we view these estimates of the refusal equation as illustrative only. They do indicate that
partial observability is a serious problem for the refusal equation. Given that RHO is
positive, it appears that borrowers with unobserved characteristics that indicate they
should be approved are more likely to refuse a loan if offered. Thus holding observable
factors constant, for these borrowers, the probability of refusal is higher than for
applicants in general. Consequently the conditional estimate of the constant term for the
refusal equation is higher and differs in sign compared to the estimate allowing for self-
selection. The statistical signiﬁcance of three of the estimated coefﬁcients differs between
the conditional and unconditional estimates although most of the parameter estimates
are similar.
One explanation for the positive RHO is that applicants with unobservable
characteristics associated with approval are less certain of approval and more likely to
make multiple loan applications in order to avoid total rejection. This is consistent with
the ﬁnding that included variables associated with higher rejection rates are also
positively related to refusal.
Conclusions
We have argued that partial observability may be an important problem in estimating
models of mortgage approval and default used in testing for discrimination and
evaluating credit risk. Although the data available for answering these questions are not
ideal, we have demonstrated that correction for selection bias using appropriate bivariate
probit techniques does make a difference in estimates of a rejection equation that has
been widely used to test for discrimination. In the case of mortgage default, the data
limitations are even more severe. Nevertheless, the test for mortgage refusal does indicate
that conditional estimates based on ordinary probit models of refusal may differ
substantially from unconditional estimates. These ﬁndings suggest the importance of
efforts to expand the data used to estimate default models to include observations on
rejected applicants. This is particularly important for estimates of default losses on
conventional mortgages at a time when rejection criteria are changing. If you do not
know the rejection process that creates the conditional sample of originated mortgages,
then maximum likelihood probit estimates of the default equation may suffer from
signiﬁcant selection bias because these estimates do not consider the process that created
the sample of originated mortgages. Thus we conclude that, to the extent that default is
like refusal, if you don’t know the process then you can’t price the mortgage.
Notes
1An elaborate review of the extensive empirical literature on mortgage default or default loss is
provided by Quercia and Stegman (1992). All empirical studies in this review use single-equation
estimation techniques. Examples of widely discussed mortgage discrimination studies based on
single-equation estimates of an applicant rejection equation include Munnell et al. (1992) and
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2If lenders are to be examined regarding their treatment of actual applicants, then the relevant
population for the unconditional inference is all households applying for mortgages at the
institution. The existence of differentiated mortgage products with different underwriting criteria,
requires estimation of separate rejection equations for each product type. However, conditional
estimates of rejection equations using only the fraction of total applicants seeking a particular
mortgage product will not yield the desired unconditional estimates appropriate for the entire
population of applicants. For other regulatory purposes, there may be interest in the potential
treatment of all mortgage applicants in the market area, regardless of the source of credit which
they were seeking. In this case the relevant population is all potential homebuyers. The data
requirements and modeling necessary to explain lender choice by all potential homebuyers are well
beyond the current state of the literature.
3The term ‘‘unobservable’’ in this context refers to what the researcher or econometrician can
observe in the data, often termed the deterministic part of the inference. The presence of error
terms eA and eR reﬂects many factors that lead applicants to choose a particular mortgage product
or lenders to reject a particular application that are not observed in the data or are observed with
substantial error. Applicants and lenders, of course, observe these factors in making their choices
but the econometrician must deal with them by adding a stochastic component to each choice
equation.
4Note that the expected value of the error term in the conditional rejection equation EC(eR)
is the expected value conditional on an application for a conventional loan being made,
EC(eR)5E(eR ?A51). However, the unconditional expectation equals zero and is given by the sum
of the expectation of the error term conditional on application and the expectation of the error
term conditional on failing to apply for a conventional mortgage. Thus the unconditional
expectation may be written as E(eR)5EC(eR)Pr(A51)1E(eR?A50)[12Pr(A51)]50. If the
government program attracts individuals whose unobserved characteristics indicate high risk, then
they would likely be rejected if they applied and E(eR | A50)>0. From the expression for E(eR), it
follows that EC(eR)<0 and estimates of the constant term in the rejection equation will be biased
downward if single-equation probit is used because this estimation procedure forces estimates of
the conditional mean of the error term to be zero. As a result, the probability of rejection for the
entire applicant population will be underestimated.
5It is not clear whether the estimates should be unconditional with respect to all applicants for a
particular mortgage product or with respect to all mortgage applicants at a particular lender or
group of lenders being examined. In subsequent discussion, we assume the former case because it
simpliﬁes the presentation. Note that the need for unconditional estimates is well recognized in the
consumer credit ﬁeld. Indeed the problem of selection bias due to rejected applications is sometimes
handled in the consumer credit ﬁeld by secretly conducting experiments in which all applications
are approved so that selection bias due to the underwriting process is eliminated. The costs of this
procedure are modest if credit limits on new accounts are small but it is prohibitively expensive for
mortgage lending. Therefore econometric solutions to the selection bias problem are needed by
mortgage lenders and their regulators.
6The Boston Fed data sample is taken from all mortgage applications at Boston MSA institutions
reporting HMDA data for 1990 and having more than twenty-ﬁve mortgage applications. All 1,013
applications by homebuyers identiﬁed as Black or Hispanic were sampled along with a random
sample of 2,340 out of 3,300 White applications. The data ﬁle made available for public use
contained 2,816 observations with some observations eliminated due to data problems.
7When individual credit history variables reﬂecting consumer credit, mortgage repayment and past
charge-offs were forced into the equations, their sign and signiﬁcance were erratic. Measurement
error appears to be a signiﬁcant problem. For example, of ﬁfty-three applicants participating in
special programs for ﬁrst-time homebuyers, ﬁfty-two were coded as having a perfect record of
previous mortgage repayment and only one was identiﬁed as lacking previous mortgage payment
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8Minority status of the applicant is based on the identiﬁcation of the individual listed as the
‘‘applicant’’ as Black or Hispanic. In a small number of cases, the co-borrower’s minority status
differed from that of the borrower.
9See, for example, simultaneous estimation without correction for sample selection by Barth,
Cordes and Yezer (1980), and extended discussion of both selection and simultaneous equations
bias by Maddala and Trost (1982), Yezer, Phillips and Trost (1994) and Rachlis and Yezer (1993).
The assumption that the distribution of credit risk among mortgage applicants can be drawn
independently of underwriting criteria adopted by the lender, as in Ferguson and Peters (1995),
implicitly assumes that applicants do not consider the likelihood of rejection when they request
mortgage terms.
10Rosenblatt (1994) has studied withdrawal of the mortgage application. We could not observe
withdrawn mortgages in this dataset and are not aware of other studies of refusal.
11Indeed, these estimates only converged when LOANV in the acceptance equation was replaced by
loan amount. Other arguments of the acceptance equation are identical to those of the rejection
equation in the previous section.
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